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heinz-theo.wagner@ggs.de 
Abstract 
What is the importance of specific control and contractual mechanisms for IT outsourcing relationship 
quality and outsourcing success? Employing a survey among financial institutions and applying 
Importance-Performance Analysis (IPA) known from marketing research, we analyse the relative 
importance of Service Level Agreements, control and contractual mechanisms for relationship quality 
and outsourcing success. Results show that, consistent with prior research, IT outsourcing 
relationship quality is positively related to outsourcing success. Extending prior research we show 
that outsourcing contract quality in general is most important for relationship quality, followed by 
control mechanisms and the characteristics of Service Level Agreements. 
We contribute to theory by revealing the differential importance of specific control and contractual 
factors for relationship quality and outsourcing success. Furthermore, we contribute to outsourcing 
practice by demonstrating the importance of specific measures in an IT outsourcing context and thus 
deliver direction for outsourcing management. 
Keywords: IT outsourcing, relationship quality, control types, contractual mechanisms, importance-
performance analysis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
IT outsourcing is defined as “the handing over to a third party the management of IT/IS assets, 
resources, and/or activities for required results” (Willcocks & Kern 1998), and often involves 
outsourcing of IT activities that are not regarded as their core competencies (Feeny & Willcocks 
1998). Billions of dollars have been spent for outsourcing contracts and great expectations such as cost 
reductions, e.g., due to lower labour costs, service improvements and access to specialized technology 
know-how have been involved with outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2008). However, outsourcing success 
is not guaranteed and firms produce mixed results, namely in the area of cost reductions. 
Consequently, literature is engaged in determining factors influencing outsourcing success. Among 
those is literature scrutinizing outsourcing relationships (e.g. Dibbern et al. 2008; Han et al. 2008; Lee 
2001). Although the literature on IT outsourcing relationships as important influencing factor for 
outsourcing success has come up with numerous insights on important aspects in such relationships, 
including hard (contractual) and soft (relational) factors, many firms still struggle to effectively 
manage their IT outsourcing relationships. While in the past years it has become increasingly clear that 
besides a good contract it is also imperative to develop and sustain a high-quality relationship between 
the collaborating parties for achieving outsourcing success, concrete guidelines showing actions to be 
taken in order to leverage relationship quality are rare. The problem is, at least, twofold: First, it is not 
fully clear what relationship quality actually is and how it should be measured. Second, there is no 
framework of managerial actions to foster relationship quality in its various dimensions. 
Our research will contribute to existing literature in following ways: First, we analyse the effect of 
different control types as well as contractual issues (characteristics in terms of service level 
agreements, and general contract quality) on the outsourcing relationship quality. Second, we examine 
the effects (and actual performance in our sample) of single indicators on the relationship quality 
dimensions and outsourcing success. 
The guiding research question of this paper thus is: 
What is the importance of specific control and contractual mechanisms on IT outsourcing relationship 
quality and outsourcing success? 
In order to investigate and answer our research question, we use data from an empirical survey among 
the 1,000 large financial institutions with a particular focus on the relationship to the IT service 
provider who is in charge of the application system for granting and managing loans.  
Our findings, consistent with prior research, show that IT outsourcing relationship quality is positively 
related to outsourcing success. Extending prior research we show that outsourcing contract quality in 
general is most important for relationship quality, followed by control mechanisms and the 
characteristics of Service Level Agreements. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, a literature overview on IT 
outsourcing relationship management is presented, with a focus on relationship quality, modes and 
mechanisms of control, and contractual governance. In section 3, we develop our research model, 
explain the used constructs, and justify the hypotheses. Section 4 addresses the survey approach, 
including a description of the data collection and the measurement of the model constructs. In section 
5, we first analyse the validity of the measurement model, followed by the structural model test and 
importance-performance analyses. In section 6, the findings are discussed and some relevant 
limitations are outlined, before the main results of this paper are summarized in section 7. 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
This section introduces outsourcing relationship quality, followed by a discussion of control types, and 
finally contractual governance is depicted. 
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2.1 Outsourcing Relationship Quality 
IT outsourcing relationships have been shown to be complex and to be engaged in extensive 
knowledge exchange between the two parties regarding business requirements and user needs 
(Dibbern et al. 2008), and thus to form the basis for inter-organisational knowledge integration 
involving the business and the IT domain that is necessary for successful outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 
2008; Tiwana 2003).  
In this vein, relationship quality has been shown to be an important factor for outsourcing success. 
Outsourcing partnerships based on, e.g., trust and cooperation were demonstrated to exert a strong 
influence on outsourcing success (Grover et al. 1996). Thus, these so called cognitive relationships 
between outsourcers (or clients) and providers (or vendors) prove to be an important component of 
relation quality. 
In their paper titled “The Developmental Process of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships”,  
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) discuss psychological contracts. Psychological contracts encompass 
“largely nonverbalized sets of congruent expectations and assumptions held by transacting parties 
about each other's prerogatives and obligations” (Ring & Van de Ven 1994, p. 100). These contracts 
are said to partly “substitute for formal contractual safeguards as reliance on trust among parties 
increases over time” (Ring & Van de Ven 1994, p. 105). 
Trust between outsourcer (the client) and provider (the vendor) has been argued to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour, in particular, if “the client invests in cooperation-enhancing activities, such as 
team building and socializing between client and vendor personnel” (Dibbern et al. 2008, p. 340). 
With this cooperation-enhancing activities the goal is to foster shared values and beliefs to reinforce 
appropriate behaviour (Das & Teng 2001). Therefore “increases in trust between parties … increase 
the likelihood that parties may be willing to make more significant and risky investments in future 
transactions” (Ring & Van de Ven 1994, p. 101). 
2.2 Contractual Governance 
Contractual governance involves “formal contractual means such as guarantees, insurance 
mechanisms, laws, and organizational hierarchy” (Ring & Van de Ven 1994, p. 93) that are typically 
employed in an outsourcing context. 
First of all, during the negotiations outsourcers and providers define, e.g., the scope of the contract, the 
goals to be achieved, the services to be provided, how to deal with changes, and conditions of payment. 
This may lead to a fixed-price contract or in a time and material contract (Dibbern et al. 2008). 
Typically, the contract is designed to address remedies for foreseeable contingencies and includes 
clauses on how to deal with unforeseeable events. 
Second, the services to be deployed by the provider are typically defined along with the expected 
quality levels, which are formulated through Service Level Agreements (SLA). An SLA is a formal 
agreement between outsourcer and provider and describes a specific service required by the outsourcer 
that shall be delivered at certain quality levels (Goo et al. 2009).  
Third, contract and SLAs come along with outcome-oriented and/or behaviour-oriented control 
mechanisms (e.g. Cardinal 2001; Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Dibbern et al. 2008; Ezzamel & 
Willmott 1998; Lee et al. 2004). Such control processes are intended to support firms to achieve their 
goals (Kirsch 1997); and are designed to exert influence on a party to carry-on actions and decide in a 
way which are consistent with the goals and objectives of the organization (Das & Teng 1998; 
Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979). In this study we are interested in formal control, because it is well 
documented in contracts and in SLAs and thus easy to retrieve. As mentioned above there are two 
types of formal control: behavioural or process control (control of process execution and employee 
behaviour) and result or outcome control (reflecting traditional comparisons of to-be and as-is) (Das & 
Teng 2001).  
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3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
In the following paragraphs we develop the model by deriving hypotheses. 
3.1 Effect of relationship quality on outsourcing success 
As discussed in the previous section the prerequisite of psychological contracts is the interaction 
between outsourcer and provider in an effective and efficient way to discuss e.g. user needs. 
Interaction procedures over time lead to a better fit between the needs of the outsourcer and the 
provider’s service offerings. Furthermore, when people trust and rely on each other, they will likely be 
more responsive and perform in a better way, because they do not want to disappoint the other part in 
such well-established relationships (Ybarra-Young & Wiersema 1999). Furthermore, the flow of 
knowledge is facilitated by trusting relationships leading to service offerings that fits the outsourcer’s 
needs (Galunic & Rodan 1998). 
Thus the provider’s knowledge about the outsourcer’s business is enhanced by partnership quality as 
well as the responsiveness to requirements of the outsourcer leading to services that match with 
business needs. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H1: Relationship quality is positively related to outsourcing success. 
3.2 Effect of SLAs on relationship quality 
SLAs define e.g. the level of detail, the definition of tasks and responsibilities, and the granularity of 
performance reports. Laying down these details helps adjusting mutual expectations and all involved 
persons will know what really needs to be delivered, which tasks to be conducted, what the priorities 
of the outsourcer’s business are, and so on. Adjusted mutual expectations reduce uncertainty regarding 
the behaviour of the involved parties. Prior research revealed that “in many interorganizational 
relationships, contracts primarily serve to define the tone and the nature of the relationship … and 
contracts or direct control are necessary to serve as a safety net” (Goo et al. 2004, p. 326). Thus the 
safeguard function of written SLAs supports relationships on the one hand by unambiguously defining 
the services to be delivered but also the measurements for service levels as well as the regulation of 
what happens if service levels are not achieved (penalty regulation), or sometimes also if the service 
exceeds the agreed upon service levels (bonus regulation). Therefore “the SLA elements that form 
foundation and governance characteristics may shape relational norms more effectively …” (Goo et al. 
2004, p. 335). However, although SLAs support the development of relationships, having good SLAs 
does not necessarily man that relationship quality is high. Nevertheless, based on above reasoning we 
expect a positive effect of SLAs on relationship quality and we thus formulate our second hypothesis: 
H2: SLAs are positively related to relationship quality. 
3.3 Effect of controls on relationship quality 
Control mechanisms encompass user satisfaction surveys that indicate the quality level of the 
delivered services, performance reports by the vendor which show the true service level, and the 
client’s possibility to directly assess the provider’s performance measurement tools. Controls cater for 
transparency on both sides. The outsourcer is readily informed about the quality of the service and the 
provider is aware of this transparency and is not able to hide possible failures. This reduces effects of 
moral hazard and fosters responsiveness and efforts of the provider to improve or maintain a good 
relationship. Although controls do not render service failures impossible they increase visibility of the 
quality of service delivery and also of the efforts to repair services in case of failure. Thus, controls 
can foster both high responsiveness of the provider and proof to the outsourcer that the provider is 
truly engaged in guaranteeing or re-installing high service quality. Therefore, similar to the 
argumentation regarding SLAs, controls function as safeguards supporting and complementing 
relationships. Thus, analogous to SLAs, we state the following hypothesis: 
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H3: Controls are positively related to relationship quality. 
3.4 Effect of contract quality on relationship quality 
Contract quality deals with accuracy of process descriptions, standards, guidelines, terms and 
conditions. Similar to SLAs a high level of contract quality helps adjusting mutual expectations by 
clarifying deliverables, tasks, roles and responsibilities, rights and liabilities. This also serves as 
safeguard for both involved parties. Consequently, formal contracts serve as complements and support 
relationships (Poppo & Zenger 2002). “Thus partner relationship attributes can be built through 
contractual means” (Goo et al. 2004, p. 326). Thus, analogous to SLAs we hypothesize: 
H4: Contract quality is positively related to relationship quality. 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data Collection 
The underlying unit of analysis in this study is the operations of the main loans system, thus 
concentrating on the cooperation between the bank and the external provider responsible for running 
and maintaining the loans systems. In our research, we particular focus on the relationship between the 
client and vendor firm, and how this relationship is affected by different types of control and 
contractual issues. Our study focused on the IT service provider which is in charge of the IS for 
managing private construction loans. In regard to this IS, we analyzed which of the following services 
are provided by the provider: operations, maintenance, 1st level support, 2nd level support, and 
development (in most cases, the provider provided all services). Almost half of the surveyed banks 
had the loans system in place for a maximum of three years, a little bit more than a third had it in place 
for four to ten years. More than half of the banks have been in the relationship to the respective 
provider for more than ten years already. Total assets ranged from approx. 300 million Euro up to 
more than 100 billion Euro, with our sample being representative for the overall population.  
The data was collected by sending questionnaires to the IT provider manager or another executive, 
who was in charge of managing the arrangement with the respective IT service provider, of the 1,000 
largest banks in Germany according to total assets in 2007. We solely contacted the corporate office of 
each bank (not several branches of a single bank) leading to the overall population being free of 
duplicates. In order to ensure that the correct person in charge will receive the questionnaire, each 
bank was called to identify the IT provider manager, to describe the survey basics, and to ask for 
participation. Those managers who agreed then received the questionnaire by their favoured channel 
(e-mail, mail, or fax). Four weeks after the initial mailing, a paper-based reminder was sent to those 
persons who had not answered yet. Another four to six weeks later the banks of which a response was 
still lacking were called again in order to assure they had received the questionnaire and to ask for the 
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reason why they had not completed it. In case of a positive signal indicating on-going willingness to 
take part in the survey, the questionnaire was sent again to the IT provider manager. Overall, 171 
mainly completed and analysable questionnaire were returned, leading to a response rate of 17.1%. 
Thus, it is in the range of other studies among managers, e.g. 13% (Kearns & Lederer 2004), 17% 
(Bhatt & Grover 2005), 11% (Bergeron et al. 2004). 
The received data then were entered into a survey application system and verified by a second person 
using the original questionnaires, before analysis started. For analysing the data and testing our model, 
we used the Partial Least Squares approach and applied the free software package SmartPLS (Ringle 
et al. 2005). The reason for using PLS is that some of our variables are non-normally distributed 
which, as opposed to covariance-based Structural Equation Methods, can be handled by PLS, because 
it does not require a specific distribution. After deleting all cases containing missing values regarding 
at least one of the used items (cf. below), a final data set consisting of 151 cases resulted. 
In a second step, and based on the PLS analysis, we performed an Importance-Performance Analysis 
(IPA), sometimes also referred to as priority map. Originally, IPA was developed by Martilla and 
James (1977) in marketing research (see also Bacon 2003). IPA allows for a combined assessment of 
both importance and performance of constructs or single items in order to identify the impact level of 
distinct factors on others while simultaneously considering the actual performance level. Thus, the 
results of IPA can help to develop guidelines in terms of focus areas which should be addressed more, 
while others can stay behind. The basic idea is to use the data from IPA to group each construct or 
item into one of four quadrants in an importance-performance matrix. Each axis then consists of two 
levels (high vs. low importance and high vs. low performance), leading to the four quadrants. While 
those constructs or items in the high importance quadrants, and in particular in the high 
importance/low performance quadrant need more management attention, those in the low importance 
quadrants should be prioritized lower. In particular, the low importance/high performance quadrant 
indicates insignificant strengths and can serve as an opportunity to shift resources to other areas. 
4.2 Measurement 
The following Table 1 shows how the different constructs have been operationalized.  
 
ID Item Scale References 
(examples) 
Outsourcing Satisfaction (OS) 
OS1 We are comfortable with the relationship to our service 
provider. 
5-point 
Likert (fully 
disagree … 
fully agree) 
(Goo & Nam 2007) 
OS2 We would recommend our service provider. (Goo & Nam 2007) 
OS3 We would retain our service provider. (Goo & Nam 2007) 
OS4 Our outsourcing relation is financially advantageous. (Goo & Nam 2007) 
Relationship Quality (RQ) 
RQ1 We use the same IT vocabulary as the service provider. 7-point 
Likert (fully 
disagree … 
fully agree) 
Own case studies 
RQ2 Both parties in the relationship communicate well with each 
other. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ3 Both parties effectively exchange information with each 
other. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ4 Both parties in the relationship can be trusted to behave 
fairly. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ5 Both parties in the relationship can be trusted not to take 
advantage of the other. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ6 We and the provider are able to reach agreement on most 
matters. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ7 Problems are commonly solved so there is no negative 
impact on the overall relationship. 
(Goles & Chin 2005) 
RQ8 Both parties are willing to compromise. Own case studies 
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Control (CTL) 
CTL1 We regularly conduct service satisfaction surveys among 
users. 
5-point 
Likert (fully 
disagree … 
fully agree) 
(Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003) 
CTL2 The granularity of the service reports meets our demands.  (Kern & Willcocks 
2000) 
CTL3 The provider’s service reports offer a true picture of the 
provider’s services.  
(Kern & Willcocks 
2000) 
CTL4 The service provider regularly shows IT training results of 
their employees.  
(Kern & Willcocks 
2000) 
Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
SLA1 The service provider has been given detailed Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs). 
5-point 
Likert (fully 
disagree … 
fully agree) 
(Lacity & Willcocks 
2003) 
SLA2 It is straightforward to change SLAs or the contract. (Lacity & Willcocks 
2003) 
SLA3 My employees exactly know what service levels (SLAs) the 
service provider has to provide. 
(Lacity & Willcocks 
2003) 
Contract Quality (CQ) 
CQ1 The outsourcing contract (including SLAs) meets all our 
requirements and expectations. 
5-point 
Likert (fully 
disagree … 
fully agree) 
Own case studies 
CQ2 The outsourcing contract (including SLAs) completely 
controls tasks and responsibilities of the partners. 
Own case studies 
CQ3 The outsourcing contract (including SLAs) does not leave 
room for discretionary interpretations. 
Own case studies 
Table 1.  Indicator Overview. 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Measurement Model 
This subsection starts with a discussion of non-response bias and common method bias. Next, the 
reliability and validity of the PLS measurement model are examined by the means of content, 
construct, and discriminant validity, as well as indicator reliability. 
5.1.1 Non-response bias and common method bias 
To ensure that non-response bias cannot be assumed, we compared the early with the late respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton 1977). This extrapolation method is based on the assumption that late 
respondents share similarities with non-respondents. We treated the late respondents, who returned the 
questionnaire after a second reminder, as non-respondents (Kearns & Lederer 2004). Comparing the 
questionnaires from the early respondents (N = 98) with these non-respondents (N = 53) using the 
Mann-Whitney test showed no significant differences for any of the used items. 
Common method bias describes the problem that the variance depends on the measurement method 
rather than on the constructs represented by the measures (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This may happen if 
the predictor as well as the criterion variables are taken from only one source (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
Thus, Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggest procedural and statistical remedies in order to avoid common 
method bias. Procedural remedies aim at the design of the study in order to reduce the potential 
influences of common method variance, whereas statistical remedies are tests to control for common 
method bias. We addressed procedural remedies due to eliminating complex and ambiguous items 
from the survey by using pre-tests; acquiescence effects were countered due to reverse-coded items; 
and social desirability effects were offset due to assuring anonymity of respondents. In order to 
address statistical remedies we applied Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ 1986) which did 
not extract a single factor accounting for the majority of variance of all used items. 
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5.1.2 PLS Measurement Model 
We tested our model partly based on reflective measures. Therefore, the PLS measurement model was 
analysed with respect to content validity, indicator reliability, and construct validity. Content validity 
examines the degree to which the supposed meaning of a construct is reflected by its measures 
(Boudreau et al. 2001). Content validity was ensured by developing questions for indicators from 
preceding research as well as by performing pre-tests to check for ambiguities. The findings from the 
pre-tests were incorporated into the questionnaire through adaptation or elimination of single 
questions. 
Indicator reliability is about the links between an indicator and its corresponding construct. Loadings 
should be above the suggested threshold of 0.707 and must not be below 0.5 (Hulland 1999). For 
testing on significance, we applied the PLS bootstrap resampling with 500 samples (Chin 1998). Both 
the loadings and the t-values for determining their significance are given by Table 2. All loadings of 
the indicators with their respective construct are above the recommended 0.707 parameter value, with 
RQ1 (.667) and RQ8 (.686) as the only exceptions (see Table 2) and significant at the 0.001 level, 
revealing indicator reliability of the tested model. For the formatively measured constructs (control 
and service level agreements), outer weights instead of loadings are shown. 
 
Construct Indicator Loading / Weight T-Value 
Outsourcing Satisfaction OS1 0.866 40.933 
OS2 0.905 57.352 
OS3 0.842 23.984 
OS4 0.708 11.553 
Relationship Quality RQ1 0.667 9.572 
RQ2 0.831 25.565 
RQ3 0.771 17.292 
RQ4 0.703 11.256 
RQ5 0.763 16.715 
RQ6 0.743 15.315 
RQ7 0.728 13.354 
RQ8 0.686 15.721 
Control (formative) CTL1 0.391 2.453 
CTL2 0.390 2.025 
CTL3 0.401 1.781 
CTL4 0.237 1.601 
Service level agreements 
(formative) 
SLA1 0.165 0.646 
SLA2 0.762 4.266 
SLA3 0.276 1.063 
Outsourcing Contract CQ1 0.880 32.797 
CQ2 0.889 19.158 
CQ3 0.800 13.351 
Table 2.  Measurement Model Parameters. 
Construct validity refers to the extent to which measurement items describe the constructs. We can 
distinguish between convergent and discriminant validity (Straub 1989; Straub et al. 2004). 
Convergent validity deals with the internal consistency if multiple measures are used for a single 
construct (Hulland 1999), analysed by calculation of the composite reliability and the Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE). An AVE above 0.5 (Chin 1998) and a composite reliability above 0.7 
(Nunnally 1978) is recommended. All constructs of our model fulfil this requirement (Table 3). 
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Construct Composite Reliability AVE Cronbach´s Alpha R Square 
Outsourcing success 0.900 0.695 0.851 0.349 
Relationship quality 0.905 0.545 0.880 0.278 
Contract quality 0.893 0.735 0.829  
Table 3.  Quality Measures for Latent Variables. 
Discriminant validity represents the extent to which the items of a latent variable differ from items of 
other latent variables in the same model (Hulland 1999). We analyse the discriminant validity in two 
steps. First, all inter-correlations between the latent variables are lower than the square root of the 
AVE (shown in the shaded cells in Table 4). This demonstrates a good fit between the latent variables 
and their measurement items (Gefen et al. 2000). 
 
  Outsourcing success Relationship quality Contract quality  
Outsourcing success 0.834   
Relationship quality 0.591 0.738  
Contract quality 0.380 0.466 0.000 
Table 4.  Correlations of Latent Variables and AVE Square Root (shaded cells). 
In a second step, we further analysed the cross-loadings between indicators and the other constructs. If 
each indicator correlates weakly with all other latent variables except for the one to which it is 
theoretically associated (shaded cells in Table 5) discriminate validity can be assumed (Gefen & 
Straub 2005; Gefen et al. 2000). As shown in Table 5, our model possesses the demanded loadings of 
indicators for their associated constructs, while having low loadings for the other constructs. 
 
Indicator Outsourcing success Relationship quality Contract quality  
OS1 0.866 0.523 0.323 
OS2 0.905 0.543 0.331 
OS3 0.842 0.481 0.293 
OS4 0.708 0.411 0.324 
RQ1 0.360 0.667 0.360 
RQ2 0.544 0.831 0.334 
RQ3 0.424 0.771 0.233 
RQ4 0.395 0.703 0.374 
RQ5 0.504 0.763 0.451 
RQ6 0.466 0.743 0.370 
RQ7 0.346 0.728 0.288 
RQ8 0.407 0.686 0.309 
CQ1 0.453 0.496 0.880 
CQ2 0.292 0.384 0.889 
CQ3 0.139 0.251 0.800 
Table 5.  Cross Loadings of Manifest Variables. 
After testing our measurement model for indicator reliability and construct validity, the next section 
focuses on the PLS structural model which is the PLS method for analysing causal relationships. 
5.2 Structural Model 
The results of our PLS analysis are presented in Figure 2. All four hypotheses are supported and, thus, 
could be accepted. As expected and hypothesized, relationship quality has a strong and highly 
significant effect on outsourcing success (H1). Also, the effects of both contract quality (H4) and 
control (H3) on relationship quality are highly significant, indicating that well-designed contracts and 
effective and constructive control mechanisms help to develop and sustain a good IT outsourcing 
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relationship. Furthermore, effective SLAs also drive relationship quality (H2). However, this 
correlation shows a lower level of significance in our sample than the other hypotheses. 
 
Figure 2.  PLS Results. 
Based on the PLS calculation results, we next conduct the importance-performance analyses. 
5.3 Importance-performance analyses 
In a first step, importance-performance analysis is done in regard to the impact and performance of the 
independent constructs on the dependent ones. 
     
Figure 3.  Importance-performance matrix of variables in regard to "relationship quality" (left) 
and “outsourcing success” (right). 
Figure 3 shows both the impact and the performance of control, service level agreements, contract 
quality (left and right), and relationship quality (right). Considering the relationship quality construct 
(left) contract quality has the highest impact (0.269) and, in our sample, has also the highest 
performance, meaning that on average, the surveyed firms have rather good contracts (63 points on a 
scale ranging from 0-100). Control is the second-most important construct (0.215) with a performance 
of 45. The least important factor is service level agreements (0.137) with a performance of 39. 
Generally, most firms achieve the best performance in the factor with the highest impact on 
relationship quality. Regarding the overall dependent variable outsourcing success (right), relationship 
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quality has a very high impact of 0.591 while also having a good performance level of 72, meaning 
that many firms in our sample report a comparatively good status in regard to relationship quality. 
While this evaluation is rather similar to what can be seen from the structural model (besides 
additionally having the performance levels included in the matrices), we extend this analysis to each of 
the formative indicators of our independent variables in order to come up with managerial guidelines 
on which actions are the most effective ones for achieving high relationship quality and outsourcing 
success. Consequently, we look at and compare the impact and performance of the indicators on 
relationship quality and outsourcing success. 
The importance-performance analysis at indicator level provides interesting results which are 
presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Importance-performance analysis of formative indicators related to relationship 
quality (left) and outsourcing success (right). 
Considering the impact on relationship quality, scores range from 0.02 (SLA1) to 0.10 (SLA2), with 
actual performance levels between 19 (CTL4) and 67 (SLA1). Ideally, the average performance levels 
would be very high for those indicators with a high impact level while more moderate for those 
indicators with a lower impact level. The four indicators in the high impact area (CTL1-3 and SLA2) 
reveal mixed results. Performance for CTL2 (granularity of service reports) and CTL3 (vendor 
providing true reports) is at least at a medium level (both around 60). CTL1 (client firm regularly 
conducts user surveys) and SLA2 (changes to SLAs/contract can easily be carried-out) show rather 
low levels. The latter indicates potential for mechanisms to be (better) implemented in order to 
leverage relationship quality and finally outsourcing success. Contrasting, the average performance 
level for SLA1 (provider has been given detailed SLAs) is comparatively high, although the impact of 
this mechanism on relationship quality is very low. Hence, this could be an aspect to decrease 
resources in favour of facilitating those mechanisms in the high importance area with a low 
performance level. The other two mechanisms in the low importance area are SLA3 (the client’s 
employees exactly know the SLAs) and CTL4 (vendor regularly shows IT training results to the 
client). CTL4 has a very low average performance level (19) indicating that such reports are not very 
common in the collaboration between client and vendor in our sample. However, since the importance 
of this indicator is not very high, improvements should first be considered for the mechanisms 
mentioned above. SLA3 with an average performance level of 49 represents an acceptable score when 
set into relationship to the rather low impact factor. Having described the main results of our PLS 
calculation and the importance-performance analysis on top of it, we provide a discussion of our 
findings in the following section. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Limitations 
Like in any survey-based research, there are some limitations that need to be considered when 
discussing and interpreting the findings. Typical limitations like common method bias (CMB), 
subjectivity of answers, and generalizability could have an effect on our results. We addressed CMB 
by using two different versions of the questionnaire (varying item order) and by applying procedural 
and statistical remedies (e.g., Harman single-factor test) which did not reveal any serious problems in 
regard to CMB. Another aspect arises from the key informant approach. We did only ask one person 
(the provider manager) on the client side, thus not capturing insights from the respective vendor in 
order to validate the given assessments. However, since the provider manager is expected to have a 
good overview on the overall relationship, we think that the given data are acceptably reliable. Next, 
generalizability is also always an issue in empirical works. In our study, we focused on a specific IT 
outsourcing relationship concerning a distinct business process in financial institutions. While this 
inhibits a broad application of the findings, it helps to come up with more concrete evidence for the 
investigated context, which is, considering the large number of financial institutions and their high 
dependence on IT systems, worth to deepen our understanding of how effective IT outsourcing 
relationships can be developed and maintained through control and contractual mechanisms. 
Furthermore, there are other limitations which are more closely related to the content of our research. 
Several works have examined outsourcing relationship quality in different contexts. While this 
construct generally is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional, we have modelled relationship quality as 
one construct. The reason is that we wanted to focus on the single control and contractual mechanisms 
that can improve relationship quality. Consequently, we see this as a first step towards a better 
understanding of how specific mechanisms work and influence relationship quality, and our findings 
support the relevance of such investigations. Nevertheless, future analyses should incorporate a 
relationship quality construct that is more detailed to better reflect the true nature of this concept. 
Finally, the operationalization of our formatively measured constructs is debatable since the number of 
indicators is limited, respectively. For both the control and the contractual/SLA mechanisms, several 
other aspects could be integrated. However, as the PLS calculation as well as the importance-
performance analysis show, impact and performance level of our set of items are quite divers, 
indicating that such examinations can have considerable descriptive and prescriptive power. So we 
will extend our model for future evaluations in order to draw a more complete picture of the set of 
control and contractual managerial actions which can be taken, and their impact on relationship 
quality. 
6.2 Discussion 
Consistent with prior research, our model supports the hypothesis that IT outsourcing relationship 
quality positively influences outsourcing success (hypothesis 1). We could furthermore show that the 
quality of the outsourcing contract in general (hypothesis 4), and specific control (hypothesis 3) and 
contractual (in terms of SLA-related) mechanisms (hypothesis 2) have varying but positive effect on 
relationship quality, and thus on outsourcing success. Of the eight detailed investigated mechanisms, 
SLAs that can easily be changed and modified (SLA2) show the highest impact on relationship 
quality. Such flexibility in the collaboration between the two parties can then yield into a more trustful 
relationship and a higher level of consensus instead of more conflicts due to inflexible SLAs which are 
expected to pollute the relationship. A little less but also very important are the following three control 
mechanisms: satisfaction surveys conducted by the client among the users of the respective IT system 
(CTL1); service reports provided by the vendor which meet the granularity demands of the client 
(CTL2); and accurate service reports from the vendor.  
Our research question was: What is the importance of specific control and contractual mechanisms on 
IT outsourcing relationship quality and outsourcing success? 
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The answer is that contract quality is highly important for both relationship quality and in turn 
outsourcing success. In addition, control and contractual mechanisms (SLAs) are other important 
factors. 
As to the control mechanisms we found that they are all very closely related to establishing and 
maintaining a good relationship between client and vendor. When the provider generates sufficiently 
granular service reports which are moreover correct this will have a direct positive effect on the 
relationship quality. However, when looking at SLA2 and CTL1, the performance levels in our sample 
are quite low, meaning that SLAs often cannot be changed easily, thus leading to conflict potential in 
the relationship. A reason for the low performance level of client-internal controls (user satisfaction 
surveys) could be found in the fact that the provider-based control mechanisms (CTL2, CTL3) are 
evaluated rather well. Client firms may then save their resources and forbear from doing own control 
activities, since they are satisfied with what the provider delivers to them. 
Looking at those control and contractual mechanism with a low(er) impact on relationship quality, 
detail SLAs given to the provider (SLA1) show the highest of all performance levels. This 
phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that the formulation of SLAs is more or less a singular action 
taken at the very beginning of an outsourcing arrangement. Often, SLAs are not even re-evaluated due 
to high workload of the respective managers or other reasons. Thus, high efforts are invested at the 
beginning, leading to very detailed agreements, which are then hard to overview, manage, and change 
(compare SLA2). Regarding high relationship quality, regular and on-going Service Level 
Management appears to be more promising than much ex ante efforts resulting in very detailed SLAs, 
followed by problems in adapting them to changing situations. 
In general, the importance-performance analysis, which is very prominent, e.g., in marketing research, 
but rare in IS research, allows us to not only investigate the impact of various control and contractual 
mechanisms for IT outsourcing relationship quality, but also to derive guidelines in regard to which 
mechanisms should be prioritized higher compared to others. Although the performance levels are 
only representative for our survey context, for which it can serve as a benchmark, this analysis can 
easily be applied to other contexts as well and help to identify areas of improvement for both 
outsourcing relationship quality and outsourcing success in general, and for single firms or 
arrangements. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, building on existing literature of IT outsourcing arrangements, and using data from a 
quantitative survey among 1,000 large financial institutions, we analyse the role of control and 
contractual mechanisms for IT outsourcing relationship quality and outsourcing success (in terms of 
satisfaction). The results show that contract quality, SLA characteristics, and control (both client and 
vendor based) significantly influence the level of relationship quality. Applying importance-
performance analysis we could specifically show the impact of single control mechanisms (like 
satisfaction surveys, service reports, etc.) and SLA characteristics (adaptability, level of detail, etc.) on 
relationship quality. While this already can help to develop guidelines for practice, the explanatory 
power further increases by also incorporating the actual performance levels of each item. In doing so, 
we could reveal some discrepancy, since some mechanisms like, e.g., SLA adaptability and end user 
satisfaction surveys by the client have a high impact, but are non-existent or poorly implemented. On 
the other hand, factors with rather low impact (e.g., detailed SLAs) show a high performance level, 
indicating failures in resource allocation. Consequently, more detailed analyses are necessary and 
future investigations should incorporate a broader set of control and contractual mechanisms to better 
identify and understand the impacts of those mechanisms on IT outsourcing relationship quality and 
outsourcing success. 
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